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ABSTRACT 
The development of housing studies as an academic discipline from its roots in the 1970s has 
seen research undertaken into a range of phenomena associated with housing, home and 
society. Different philosophical approaches have been adopted by housing researchers in 
their studies to help them to carry out their explorations, examinations and investigations. 
This article presents an analysis of one philosophical approach which can help the housing 
researcher in their quest for knowledge. It looks at the philosophy of critical realism (CR), 
the relationship that it has with housing studies and how it can be used as an approach 
within housing research. Three core aspects are looked at through three parts within the 
article. The first part provides an introduction to CR, describing key aspects and highlighting 
fundament parts of the philosophical approach. The second part of the article considers the 
role of philosophy in relation to research and the overall approaches that underlie 
philosophical approaches. The third part of the article focuses on realism in housing 
research and compares social constructionist and CR approaches within this philosophical 
tradition in relation to their appropriateness for research within the field of housing studies. 
At the end of the article the main strands are brought together in a concluding section. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CR offers the researcher an approach that 
allows them to apply a theory of reality 
that enables the subject matter being 
explored to be analyzed. This philosophy 
provides analytical tools which allow the 
researcher to look at the drivers and other 
factors that impact upon the subject matter. 
This is through the perspective of a 
stratified ontological approach. It is 
claimed by Bhaskar [1] that knowledge of 
the social world is a product of the social, 
historical, and political conditions in 
which it operates. The existence of an 
objective material world is acknowledged 
by the researcher, as well as a socially 
constructed world in which individuals co-
exist with each other to forming bonds and 
relationships from which structures in 
society develop. Lawson [2] states that 
these structures differ in form, rules, and 
processes which govern how they operate 
as well as their interaction with ‘actors 
with agency’. The nature of structure 
impacts on the agency of actors and vice 
versa with new aspects, activities, events, 
and change emerging from these 
interactions. The complexities that 
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influence these changes are driven and 
caused by mechanisms that lie beneath the 
surface. Lawson [3] asserts that CR 
provides ‘an ontological theory for 
abstracting causal mechanisms’ that can help 
with the development of an understanding of 
these emerging change elements. 
 
PART ONE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
CRITICAL REALISM (CR) 
CR has evolved from the work of Bhaskar, 
[4–8] and has developed as a philosophical 
approach in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries. Prominent academics across a 
number of disciplines have contributed to 
the development of this philosophy such as 
Collier [9] in the field of philosophy, 
Archer [10–14] and Sayer [15–18] in the 
fields of sociology.CR has become 
increasingly used as a framework for 
undertaking investigations in different 
discipline areas including nursing [19–21], 
management [22], social work [23] and 
housing research [24]. In CR, both the 
natural world and the social worlds are 
recognized, and these are explored in 
different ways [25]. The world of the 
natural is researched using empirically 
based methodologies that measure, 
experiment and analyze, but investigations 
into the world of the social, cannot apply 
these approaches in the same way. The 
social world does not function in the same 
way as the world of nature. Schostak [25] 
states that to investigate and study the 
social world that is made up of agents who 
construct/de-construct their reality 
constantly, methods of measurement have 
‘to be re-thought for applicability in the 
social worlds of people’. Prout [26] 
identifies that the approach should also be 
conducive to the heterogeneous nature of 
social relations within society. Bhaskar 
takes the view that from a realist 
ontological perspective, the complexities 
in social relations within society show both 
identifiable independence of both people 
and society as well as their interdependence 
on each other. 
 
Stratified Reality  
CR views reality as ‘a stratified, open 
system of emergent entities’ [27] which 
means that things can happen that make a 
difference in the world, but they are 
related to the environment that they are in 
or the conditions that surround them. To 
view how things can happen, CR uses a 
stratified ontology which divides reality 
into three differentiated layers. These three 
layers were called domains by Bhaskar 
[28], and labelled as the empirical, the 
actual, and the real. O’Mahoney and 
Vincent, clarify how the CR approach to 
ontology differs from the positivist 
position, which ‘equates reality with 
recordable events’ and the social 
constructionist position which ‘collapses 
ontology to discourse’. Sayer differentiates 
the stratified ontology of CR compared to 
other ontologies, ‘which have flat 
ontologies populated by either the actual 
or the empirical, or a conflation of the two. 
In contrast to these other ontologies where 
only the observable exists, CR has at the 
level of the real, the structures and objects 
that are hidden and whose powers can be 
released to generate events. The three 
layers within CR show things happening 
and how they happen. Specific terms are 
employed to describe these aspects and to 
relate them to each domain. Table 1 
identifies each domain, the aspect 
associated with it, the specific term 
assigned and a definition. 
 
At the level of the real exist social 
structures (a group of objects) or objects 
which have causal powers. These powers 
are released through the activation of 
mechanisms at the level of the actual that 
cause events to happen, and the experience 
of these events is at the level of the 
empirical.  
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Table 1. Ontological levels and defined terms in CR. 
Domain Aspect Term Term Definition 
Empirical What has happened and was 
experienced or perceived 
Event Things that happen [29], things that occur, things that are 
visible and things that are experienced/perceived 
Actual How or what caused the 
happening to happen 
Mechanism A process in a concrete system that makes it what it is [30] 
Ways of acting of things [28] 
Triggers that cause things to happen  
Central to the philosophy of CR [31] 
Real Conditions or environment that 
enable the happening to be triggered 
Structure Sets of internally related objects or practices [16] 
 
Table 2. A comparison of labels used by CR researchers [4, 16, 17, 28, 32, 33] 
Domain Bhaskar Sayer Mingers and Wilcocks Smith and Johnston 
Empirical Experiences Events Events Events (Experienced) 
Actual Events Mechanisms Events / Non-Events / Mechanisms Events / Non-Events 
Real Mechanisms Structures Mechanisms / Structures Mechanisms / Structures 
 
Social structures at the level of the real are 
hidden, some mechanisms at the level of 
the actual are hidden, and some are 
observable, whereas most experiences and 
the level of the empirical are observable. 
Although structures are hidden, at the level 
of the real, their effects can be seen or 
interpreted at the level of the empirical. 
The language employed by Bhaskar and 
other CR writers, use different labels can 
be used to describe the domains and what 
is within them. An example of this is 
shown in Table 2. 
 
In this article, the language and 
interpretation of the three domains by 
Sayer are adopted. This is so that only one 
set of terms are usable in relation to a 
specific domain and for which an 
understanding has been developed, it 
provides the research with clarity. This 
would not be the case if terms were used 
interchangeably. It was felt that the terms 
used by Sayer, provide an understandable 
explanation of the linking between the 
three layers within CR. This is important 
to the study because the investigation is 
exploring how specific processes work 
within housing from a CR perspective. 
There are differences between the three 
layers about what is visible and what is 
hidden. At the level of the empirical, 
events that happen and their effects can be 
seen. Below the level of direct 
observation, O’Mahoney and Vincent, 
identify that ‘deeper levels awaiting 
discovery’ for the CR researcher. Where 
there is no direct observation at the levels 
of the actual and the real, the author is 
looking to move away from the concrete to 
the abstract in order to theories about 
mechanisms at the level of the actual and 
structures at the level of the real. Figure 1 
identifies the three layers, the aspects 
relating to each level, and the associated 
terms. The diagram uses a tree to illustrate 
how each level operates, what can be 
observed, and what is hidden. 
 
Figure 1 has been adapted from the 
original to show that at the level of the 
actual, an additional line of vision has 
been put in to show that some causal 
mechanisms are hidden, and some are 
observable. In the original, the wall is 
higher, and the line of sight from the 
individual is above the wall, which 
identifies causal mechanisms as hidden. It 
identifies that at the level of the empirical, 
the branches of the tree, which are events 
that happen, can be directly observed. At 
the level of the actual, the middle of the 
tree trunk can be directly observed, but the 
lower part of the tree trunk is hidden and 
cannot be directly observed. Following 
this, some of the mechanisms that operate 
at this level and which generate events can 
be seen whereas others are hidden. 
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Fig. 1. Three ontological levels in CR [19]. 
 
Table 3. CR stratified ontology—two social housing examples. 
Level 
Social Housing example: 
Homelessness 
Social Housing example: 
Eviction 
Observability 
Empirical events that happen Rough Sleeping Moving out/Bailiffs 
attending 
Directly 
Observable 
Actual mechanisms that generate 
events 
Leaving accommodation 
Asked to leave 
Relationship breakdown 
Court dates 
Rent arrears 
UC late payment 
Directly 
Observable 
Not observable 
Real structures within which 
mechanisms operate 
Poverty 
No job 
No social structure 
Welfare Reform Not Observable 
 
At the level of the real, the roots of the 
tree, which are the structures in which 
mechanisms operate, are hidden and 
cannot be directly observed. To illustrate 
this further, Table 3 identifies two key 
situations in social housing in relation to 
each level and their observability. 
 
In Table 3 at the level of the real, are 
presented the overall structure(s) that 
relate to the specific social housing 
example. These are hidden and are not 
observable. At the level of the actual, the 
mechanisms that cause events to happen 
are graded with the ones higher up the 
list being directly observable and those 
lower in the list as being not observable. 
An example would be someone being 
asked to leave their accommodation 
could be observable, whereas the process 
of a relationship breakdown would not 
be. At the level of the empirical, the 
effects of the events that have happened 
are directly observable, a person sleeping 
rough or the bailiffs attending to an 
eviction. The relationship and interaction 
between the three layers are presented in 
Figure 2. 
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Fig. 2. Relationship and interaction between the three layers [16, 17]. 
 
On the left-hand side are identified the three 
ontological levels and, on the right-hand 
side, are exemplified different interactions 
that can occur between the levels. The 
diagram has been adapted by locating the 
three layers on the reader’s left-hand next to 
alongside the diagrammatical representation 
from Sayer of the interaction between the 
layers. Arrows show the interaction between 
the different levels, and these can vary, such 
as one arrow going from M1 to E1, but three 
going from M2 to E1, E2, and E3. Figure 2 
illustrates that one mechanism can trigger 
one or three events. 
 
Causality and Causal Mechanisms 
Research that uses an historical approach to 
inquire into the social sciences is searching 
to gain an understanding of why events 
happen and why they happen in a certain 
way. In examining the reasons why an event 
happened, and by trying to understand what 
caused it to happen, a process of inquiry 
about the nature of the causation about the 
event is set in motion. Causality refers to the 
‘causal processes, causal interactions, and 
causal laws’ that help the researcher explain 
and ‘understand why certain things happen’ 
[34]. In the history of philosophical thought 
‘causality’ and’ causation’ have been 
worked on by philosophers, thinkers, and 
academics through time from Aristotle in 
Ancient Greece and Thomas Aquinas in the 
Middle Ages to Descartes, Hobbes, Leibniz, 
Locke, Newton, Hume, Kant, and Mill in the 
contemporary era [35]. In this rich history, 
there is a wealth of understanding and a 
variety of views about ‘causality’ and 
‘causation’ which have also been influenced 
by theological beliefs and the development 
of scientific inquiry. Sayer, states that 
‘causation has proved a particularly 
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contentious concept in philosophy and 
several different versions of it form integral 
parts of competing philosophical positions. 
A few contemporary academics have tried to 
reduce the number of approaches to 
‘causality’ as well as the core arguments 
behind them. Raduescu and Vessey [36] 
claimed that there were two different views 
of causality that have been advanced by 
academics, the Humean view, which 
explains causality through patterns and 
variables as well as the causal realist view 
which considers causality through 
underlying mechanisms and powers. 
Pawson [37] outlined three models of 
causality, secessionist, configurational, and 
generative. The Secessionist Model 
examines variables to identify causal agents 
and influences. The Configurational Model 
views the attributes of cases within a specific 
area to understand differences in outcomes. 
The generative Model acknowledges the 
role of mechanisms in causality. They are 
not measurable or visible as variables or 
attributes and are subject to the interactions 
of individuals from which outcomes 
emerge. There is alignment between the 
causal realist and generative positions. The 
generative concept of cause finds out how 
an event has been generated, how it 
happened and what conditions or factors 
enabled it to happen [38, 39]. 
 
Realist research endeavours to explore and 
understand how the different powers that 
objects have cause things to happen and 
how they do this rather than providing a 
descriptive explanation of the event, how 
it was caused, and the effect of this. As 
well as having causal powers, objects, and 
relations have liabilities that restrain them 
from doing things or acting in a certain 
way. The powers and liabilities that 
objects and relations can be enacted or 
may never be enacted. The way in which 
objects act is referred to in the literature as 
a mechanism. These are themselves 
subject to potential change as objects and 
relations are affected by internal and 
external influences that can modify their 
powers and liabilities. In the field of 
housing this can be exemplified by the 
following: a house as a physical building 
can provide shelter, but this can change if 
the roof is removed or the building is burnt 
down; a person may lose their employment 
which will change their ability to pay rent; 
a person with a drug addiction may change 
their behaviour to come off drugs. 
 
Causation through the triggering of a 
mechanism at the level of the actual that 
releases the powers of a structure (a group 
of objects) or an object at the level of the 
real is relational to the conditions of the 
specific situation and the impact of other 
mechanisms. Figure 3 highlights the CR 
view of causation and illustrates the 
triggered mechanism impacted by the 
conditions of the specific situation and as 
well as other mechanisms. Figure 4 
illustrates an example from the practical 
application to the field of housing. 
 
In Figure 4, the homeless person has the 
power to take steps to try and resolve their 
situation. They want to access 
accommodation because they need shelter 
and through applying for housing 
assistance, they can access accommodation. 
The causal power has been activated, and 
the homeless person has accessed 
accommodation. However, maintaining this 
shelter may depend on other conditions 
(short timescale) or other mechanisms 
(access to work, welfare, funds). In the case 
of situations in the social world, the 
subjective nature of conditions or other 
mechanisms means that it is difficult to 
predict what causes something to happen. 
According to Sayer, ‘what causes 
something to happen has nothing to do with 
the number of times we have observed it 
happening’ but requires identification of the 
‘causal mechanisms and how they work 
and discovering if they have been activated 
and under what conditions’. 
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Fig. 3. CR view of causation [17]. 
 
 
Fig. 4. CR view of causation—a housing example. 
 
Relations: Necessary and Contingent 
Relations in CR are defined as being 
necessary (internal) and contingent 
(external) [40]. A necessary relation 
occurs when one object is dependent on 
the other. The ‘relation between a landlord 
and tenant; the existence of one 
necessarily presupposes the other’. In a 
contingent relation, the object does not 
need to be in a necessary relation with 
another object. Easton, clarifies the 
difference between the two types of 
relations, ‘entities can have some relations 
(necessary) that will affect one another and 
some (contingent) that may affect one 
another’. Both types of relation are 
important and can be present together. 
Lawson claims that necessary relations are 
defined in the context of contingent 
relations. Sayer highlights that certain 
qualifications have to be acknowledged 
when looking at both types of relationship. 
He argued that within necessary relations, 
each entity can be seen individually, and 
although two or more entities are in a 
relationship, they are not defined by each 
other. Sayer, states that the entities in a 
necessary relationship can change, but not 
individually ‘one part is tied to change in 
another’. Lawson asserts that necessary 
relations existing between a number of 
different entities in the housing system 
such as ‘tenants to landlords, landowners 
to purchasers, borrowers to lenders, and 
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commissioners of projects to builders’. 
She was carrying out a comparative study 
of housing systems in Australia and the 
Netherlands to look at the ‘causal 
mechanisms underlying housing networks 
over time and space’. In her study she 
outlined a cluster of necessary relations 
between social structures that underlie the 
housing network. Social structures are 
comprised of objects which are have 
necessary relations, but which can have 
contingent relations with other objects. 
They can change with the impact of other 
relations on them through the release of 
powers or emergence of new phenomena. 
Structures can also exist within larger 
structures. Lawson compared the clusters 
underlying the housing networks in both 
countries in order to ‘postulate, revise, 
and contrast clusters of causal 
mechanisms in different case studies, 
towards an explanation of difference’. 
Sayer claimed that there can be a 
difference in the importance of contingent 
relations in that some may be 
insignificant, and some may be important. 
Lawson, presented the contingent 
relations as equal, but by using Sayers’s 
qualification approach, it can be said that 
they are not equal and that some are 
insignificant, and some are important 
Sommerville [41] acknowledged the 
contribution that the work of Lawson had 
made in using a CR framework to analyze 
the broader housing systems in Australia 
and the Netherlands. He claimed that the 
distinction that Lawson had made between 
necessary and contingent relations was 
‘insufficiently clear,’ that the ‘concept of a 
(national) housing system’ remained 
unanalyzed and questioned if ‘it a realistic 
category or not?’. Sommerville goes on to 
critique CR itself. He questions if the CR 
approach enables the correct causes behind 
the activation of events to be identified or 
if it can help with the identification of 
‘what can count as the right (or wrong) 
contingent conditions’. Sommerville, goes 
on to claim that CR is one of several 
different approaches to the identification 
of causes behind phenomena such as Path 
Dependency, Institutionalism (which he 
feels Lawson’s approach is akin to). 
Within housing studies, CR has also been 
used to investigate the causation of 
homelessness [42]. CR has been suggested 
as an approach that can ‘enable account to 
be taken of the full range of potential 
causal factors in homelessness and their 
necessary and contingent inter-
relationships while avoiding making 
anyone level logically prior to all others. 
The experience of homelessness can 
happen to a person as the result of a 
combination of structural, contextual, or 
individual factors and emerge from the 
interaction of necessary and contingent 
relations. This discussion illustrates the 
contested area within which CR is located 
as a research method. 
 
Emergence 
Sayer defines emergence as ‘situations in 
which the conjunction of two or more 
features or aspects give rise to new 
phenomena’. Elder-Vass [43] states that the 
phenomena that emerge ‘has properties or 
powers that are not possessed by its parts’, 
but it cannot exist without its constituent 
parts. Mihata [44] illustrates this point 
through the concept of water, which has 
emergent properties that its constituent 
parts, hydrogen, and oxygen do not have. 
Theorists have held that phenomena emerge 
as their constituent parts become organized, 
and the relations between them become 
stable [45–47]. 
 
Archer examined emergence over time 
(morphogenesis) and the interplay between 
structure and agency. She illustrated the 
process by developing a cyclical model 
that highlights transformation and 
reproduction in three phases (structural 
conditioning, social interaction, and social 
elaboration) and is shown in Figure 5. 
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Fig. 5. The basic morphogenetic cycle [10]. 
 
In the model, structural conditioning at (T1) 
refers to structures that are already in 
existence at a point in time that are 
emergent and necessary outcomes resulting 
from the past actions of agents. Social 
interaction between structure and agency is 
represented between (T2) and (T3), which 
are points in time with the outcome being a 
transformation or reproduction of that 
structure. These outcomes are shown at 
point (T4) and labelled as structural 
elaboration (morphogenesis) and structural 
reproduction (morphostasis) by Archer [10]. 
 
PART TWO: WHAT IS RESEARCH 
Research has been defined as ‘any form of 
disciplined enquiry that aims to contribute 
to a body of knowledge of theory’ [48] and 
by Mertens [49] as an investigation or 
enquiry into a subject. This research could 
be an inquiry into the natural world or into 
the social world. The research in this thesis 
is exploring the social world. New [50] 
identified that the researcher exploring the 
social world should be clear about their 
philosophical position as well as the 
ontology that they use. This part of the 
article identifies the philosophical 
approach used in the research and 
ontology of that philosophy. 
 
Knowledge and Philosophy 
Before the time of Plato, knowledge has 
been studied by philosophers seeking to 
gain an understanding of the world. 
Knowledge is ‘what is known,’ and the 
body of knowledge develops over time as 
new information, research findings, and 
new knowledge are added. Knight and 
Turnbull [51] suggest that there are 
relationships between knowledge and 
historical timescales as well as social, 
political, and cultural contexts. 
Furthermore, that these relationships 
impact upon the use and development of 
knowledge. The study of knowledge is 
called epistemology which comes from the 
Greek ‘ἐπιστήμη’ (epistími) (knowledge), 
and epistemologists look at the origin, 
nature, scope, and limits of knowledge 
[52, 53]. Together with epistemology, in 
philosophy, the two essential concepts of 
ontology and axiology are used. Ontology 
which comes from the Greek ‘οντο’ (to be) 
describes the nature of reality and axiology 
which comes from the Greek ‘ἀξίᾱ’ (value 
or worth) refers to the study of values and 
believes. 
 
Philosophers, academics, and researchers 
have used these core concepts to adopt 
different philosophical positions 
concerning knowledge and reality. These 
philosophical positions range between two 
overall approaches positivism and 
subjectivism. The three philosophical 
concepts are shown in Figure 6 as arrows 
that are presented along a continuum 
between the positivist and subjectivist 
positions. 
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Fig. 6. Three philosophical concepts. 
 
Philosophical Approaches 
Bryman [54] asserts that there are different 
views about the scope, range, ordering, 
and labelling of philosophical approaches. 
There are two main approaches 
underpinning philosophy, positivism and 
subjectivism. Holden and Lynch [55] have 
described these two approaches as ‘polar 
opposites’ on a continuum ‘with varying 
philosophical positions aligned between 
them’. Kulatunga et al. [56] claim that 
positivism acknowledges the objective 
reality of objects and events independent 
of the individual, and that subjectivism is 
where reality is perceived by the 
individual. Crotty indicates that the 
positivist understands the world by 
rational, systematic and empirically based 
processes but the subjectivist understands 
the world through the perception of the 
individuals who experience them, where 
‘meaning is not discovered but 
constructed’. Positivism identifies that 
through observing phenomena, theories 
can be drawn up and predictions made 
about the world. This approach has been 
criticized for being a closed process which 
views causality as patterns of regularity 
between events or variables. 
 
The development of knowledge in Europe 
has historically been driven by the 
positivist tradition with the subjectivist 
and realist approaches emerging later. 
Crotty describes positivism as ‘the march 
of science’, which provided empirically 
based accurate knowledge about the 
world during the enlightenment (14th to 
the 18th centuries), replacing the belief-
based understanding of the middle ages. 
The emergence of subjectivism and the 
sociology of knowledge in the 19th and 
20th centuries is providing a balance to 
positivism to understand reality through 
the meanings constructed by people as 
they interpret the world and awareness of 
external objects assigns meaning rather 
than their existence. Commentators have 
advanced theoretical frameworks that 
have presented the relationship between 
positivism and subjectivism. Burrell and 
Morgan [57] developed the Subjective-
Objective Dimension. Evely et al. [58] 
advanced the Positivist Subjectivist 
Continuum (Table 4) and Saunders et al. 
[59] proposed the Research Onion. The 
Subjective-Objective Dimension and 
Positivist Subjectivist Continuum 
frameworks are linear with positivism at 
one end of the line and subjectivism at the 
other end. Saunders et al, illustrate the 
relationship in a circular model with 
positivism at the top of the circle and 
subjectivism, which they label as 
pragmatism, at the bottom of the circle. 
Holden and Lynch, report that the 
labelling that is used for the philosophical 
approaches of positivism and 
subjectivism in these frameworks can be 
different.  
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Table 4. The dimensions of three underlying philosophical approaches [58]. 
Philosophical 
Approach 
Positivism Realism Subjectivism 
Positivism Structural Realism Critical Realism Social 
Constructionism 
Ontological 
Assumption 
Reality as a concrete 
structure 
Reality as a concrete 
process 
Reality as an interplay 
between a concrete structure 
and influenced by perception 
Reality as a social 
construction  
Methodology 
Type 
Quantitative / 
Empirical 
Quantitative and 
Qualitative 
Quantitative and Qualitative Qualitative 
 
Data Collection Experiments / 
Surveys 
Interactive interviews Interactive interviews Interviews / 
participant 
observation 
Potential 
Interpretation 
Generalization, 
inductive and 
deductively valid 
arguments 
Hypothetico-
deductivist mode 
Generalization, although 
does not allow 
contingent 
generalizations to be 
treated as necessary 
causal mechanism, 
hypothetico-deductivist 
mode 
Abstraction and retroduction, 
generalization, although it 
does not allow contingent 
generalizations to be treated 
as necessary causal 
mechanisms. hypothetic 
deductive mode 
No Generalization as 
there can be no 
universal truth 
Example of 
Academic 
Housing 
Research 
Study of non-profit 
housing, Kemeny et 
al. [60] 
Theory of Housing 
provision, Ball and 
Harloe [61] 
Explaining Homelessness, 
Fitzpatrick S [24] 
Analysis of Housing 
Management—
Franklin and 
Clapham [62] 
 
Table 4 presents the dimensions of three 
underlying philosophical approaches 
looking at positivism, subjectivism, and 
realism. It has been adapted by focusing 
on the three philosophical approaches, 
taking out the characteristics in the first 
column of the original, and adding a 
column with an example of academic 
housing research for each approach. 
Identified in the table are ontological 
assumptions, methodological type, data 
collection methods, potential ways of 
interpretation, and an example for each 
one from academic housing research. 
Highlighted in the table are some of the 
differences between the philosophical 
approaches. Evely et al, state that these are 
‘differences in what represents adequate 
knowledge, and different research 
strategies and methods used’. The realist 
approach occupies the middle ground on 
the Positivist Subjectivist Continuum 
between these two philosophical positions. 
Originating from the works of Plato and 
Aristotle in Ancient Greece, the 
philosophy of realism has had a long 
history of development. Philosophers such 
as Comenius, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, 
Kant, and James have influenced the 
development of realism. Realism has been 
defined as a ‘philosophical doctrine which 
asserts the objective existence of universal 
concepts’ and ‘which defends that 
anything perceived by the senses has an 
independent existence of the thing 
perceived’ [63]. Saunders et al, note that 
the realist ontological perspective 
considers that there is a real-world in 
existence that is independent from the 
experiences of the individual and that it 
acknowledges both the positivist and 
subjectivist epistemological positions. 
 
Putnam [64] has identified that the realist 
approach is wide-ranging, covering a 
number of positions and that there is not a 
single point of view. He has also said that 
the realist approach has also been 
criticized from a subjectivist standpoint 
for rejecting multiple realities of the 
world and the different perceptions that 
individuals have of the world. Mulaik 
[65] identified that it criticizes the focus 
that realism puts on causality as a concept 
in terms of their view on causal 
mechanisms. In Table 4, two philosophical 
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positions are identified as realist: structural 
realism and CR. Chakravarrty [66] claims 
that structural realism combines beliefs in 
the positivist approaches of scientific 
theory that describe the world of physical 
objects and recognizes the social world as 
being subject to continual change. Yeung 
[67] advises that like structural realism, 
CR acknowledges the existence of a 
world of physical objects, but it also 
acknowledges the critical role that human 
perception plays. 
 
PART THREE: REALISM IN 
HOUSING RESEARCH 
Research in housing studies interfaces 
with different discipline areas such as 
political science, geography, social 
sciences, economics, environment, and 
building technology. This is because it can 
require a combination of facts from these 
different discipline areas to explain 
phenomena about an aspect of housing that 
is being researched. Basset and Short [68] 
identified four types of approach within 
housing research, ecological, neo-classical, 
institutional, and Marxist. The ecological 
approach was defined as being linked to 
the broader field of human ecology, and 
this was exemplified by the work of Park 
et al. [69] who studied spatial patterns of 
residential structure in urban areas. The 
Neo-classical approach was defined as 
being linked to the wider field of neo-
classical economics, and this was 
exemplified by the work of Alonso [70], 
who researched utility maximization 
regarding the use of land and consumer 
choice. The Institutional approach was 
defined as being linked to the wider field 
of Weberian sociology, and this was 
exemplified by the work of Pahl [71], who 
looked at housing managers as being 
gatekeepers to allowing access to housing. 
The Marxist approach was linked to the 
wider field of Marxism and exemplified 
through the work of Harvey [72], who 
looked at housing as a commodity and 
Castells [73], who looked at the 
reproduction of labour power. These two 
texts were influential in bringing a new 
perspective into the analysis of problems 
within society. In 1872, Engels [74] wrote 
about housing within the context of a class 
struggle. This class struggle was about 
capitalist landlords making profits through 
the renting of property to the proletarian 
working classes in urban areas. Lawson 
declared that challenges to the dominance 
of social theories, in the late 1960s and 
1970s manifested themselves in a more 
critical approach being taken by housing 
and urban social researchers to understand 
problems in society such as social 
inequality and conflict. Basset and Short, 
identify that during this time, housing 
studies began to emerge as an academic 
discipline. They say that it has evolved 
from the traditional perspective of being 
part of other academic disciplines such as 
sociology, urban, and political studies. 
Housing has historically been written 
about within the context of social 
relations, political issues, environmental, 
and economic conditions. 
 
Realist researchers have examined the 
complex relationships between different 
actors and structures as well as between 
structures within housing systems. 
According to Lawson [75], realist housing 
researchers argue ‘that housing is not only 
subject to commodification but vulnerable 
to shifting circuits of capital, changing 
modes of social regulation and crises 
prone regimes of capital accumulation’. 
Researchers taking a realist approach, are 
seeking to explore the dynamics and 
effects of continual change within the 
complex relationships that exist within 
housing systems. During the 1980s and 
1990s, several academic studies that 
examined the development of housing 
systems in Britain and other countries 
were undertaken [76–80]. Ball developed 
his model ‘The Structure of Housing 
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Provision’ (TSHP), which explored the 
production, exchange, and 
commodification of housing in capitalist 
countries. He described the TSHP as ‘a 
historically given process of providing and 
reproducing the physical entity, housing, 
focusing on the social agents essential to 
the process and the relations between 
them’ [81]. Ball took the view that the 
academic studies that focused on the 
distribution of state subsidies to different 
types of tenure did not explain the whole 
housing system. He focused on the 
production and consumption of housing, 
not just as a physical process, but as a 
social one that is monopolized by the 
vested economic interests [82]. Ball 
included TSHP as part of an institutional 
analysis approach that assessed the 
influences of economics and power over 
time. During the 1980s, when TSHP was 
developed, a consumption-oriented 
approach to housing was dominant within 
the political and economic environment. 
The approach began to consider other 
social relations between social agents 
involved within the process who had 
previously been neglected. Ball, states that 
the identification of social agents involved 
in the ‘production, allocation, 
consumption, and reproduction relations of 
housing’ is important in analyzing the 
whole housing system. In his theory of 
structuration, Giddens [83], identified that 
structures have rules and procedures that 
shape the actions of a social agent who 
subsequently reproduces the structure. 
TSHP brings together an approach that 
explores the role of agents and their 
relations to the structures within those 
housing systems. 
 
In the 1990s, Ambrose developed the 
chain of provision framework, which 
examined the roles of the different agents 
who were engaged in the housing system. 
Ambrose also developed a model that 
illustrated the shift in power in the 
provision of housing from the state to the 
market. Lawson, states that the state sector 
is characterized as being ‘democratic, 
responsive to need and allocating on this 
basis’, but the market is ‘undemocratic, 
responsive to effective demand and 
allocating based on capacity to pay’. There 
has been interplay between state 
intervention and the forces of the free 
market in the provision of housing during 
the late 19th, 20th, and 21st centuries. 
Different theories have been advanced by 
researchers to understand these changes to 
housing systems. Harloe [84], developed a 
theory of convergence that identified 
different phases of mass and residual 
housing provision, which were linked to 
changes in capitalism in the 20th century. 
Kemeny [85] developed a theory of 
divergence that examined the role of the 
state in intervening in rental markets. As 
well as the relationship between the state 
and the market, other structural aspects 
and factors contribute to the development 
of housing systems such as the availability 
of land and finance. According to Lawson, 
when trying to research those factors, it 
can be difficult to ‘isolate, observe or 
measure’ them. Furthermore, she asserts 
that the philosophy of CR can help do this 
by providing ‘an ontological theory for 
abstracting causal mechanisms that can 
emerge from the realm of dominant ideas, 
material resources, and social relations, 
which are contended to underlie forms of 
housing provision’. The application of CR 
to aspects of the housing system can 
illuminate the specific mechanisms at 
work and it offers to explore beneath the 
surface. This philosophy has been crucial 
because it enabled the research to consider 
the context relating to each SHP to 
understand what has caused certain things 
to happen and under what circumstances 
have SHPs undertaken a specific course of 
action. Although SHPs are facing similar 
challenges within their operational 
environment the specific range of factors 
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relating to each organization will be 
different. The CR philosophical approach 
helps to separate and identify these factors.  
 
Housing Research: CR vs Social 
Constructionism 
The discipline of housing studies, Jacobs 
et al. [86] suggest, started to develop 
during the latter part of the 20th century 
when positivist and empirical approaches 
that used an evidence-based policy 
analysis approach were dominant. 
Somerville and Bengtson [87] claim that in 
the last 20 years, more theoretically based 
approaches have been employed by 
housing researchers, and social 
constructionism has become dominant 
within housing studies. Jacobs et al, view 
social constructionism as a broad 
paradigm within which in research with 
different emphasis can be accommodated. 
Clapham [88] has claimed that the 
traditional approach of the housing 
researcher has been challenged in recent 
years because of the change that has 
occurred in society. The complex nature of 
some of the housing issues facing 
researchers in the 21st century has required 
the employment of a range of 
methodological and philosophical 
approaches. Gibb and Marsh [89] 
highlighted this when they wrote a paper 
on the use of a systems thinking approach 
which provides the researcher with ‘an 
array of useful concepts, mental models 
and modes of thinking that can inform and 
help structure housing policy and strategy 
development’. 
 
Social constructionism has a long research 
tradition within the social sciences and 
encompasses different perspectives, 
including discourse analysis, sociological, 
and symbolic interactive approaches. 
Jacobs et al, state that the range of 
perspectives employed by housing 
researchers increased and this has 
‘extended’ the understanding beyond ‘the 
confines of the ‘state versus market 
narrative to cover areas generally 
perceived to be within the domain of 
cultural geography, ethnography, and 
social anthropology’. Fopp [90] has 
suggested that housing researchers employ 
different approaches in their work because 
they want to gain a greater understanding 
of the problems being investigated. This 
greater understanding involves an 
exploration of the causes behind these 
problems and the experiences of people 
who face them. Jacobs and Manzi [91] 
state that the social constructionist 
epistemology views the experience that an 
individual has as ‘an active process of 
interpretation rather than a passive 
material apprehension of an external 
physical world’. King [92] points out that 
social constructionism has been criticized 
for upholding a relativist view of 
knowledge. Woolgar and Pawluch [93] 
labelled social constructionism as 
‘ontological gerrymandering’ where the 
researcher manipulates the boundaries 
between perception and what is real. 
Jacobs et al, state that social 
constructionism ‘denies the existence of an 
objective material world’. However, Collin 
[94] asserts that social constructionists 
argue that ‘their perception of the material 
world is affected by the way we think and 
talk about it, by our consensus about its 
nature, by the way, we explain it to each 
other, and by the concepts we use to grasp 
it’. Cruikshank [95] views social 
constructionism as ‘a broad tradition’ and 
claims that social constructionists take ‘a 
negative approach based on scepticism’ 
where knowledge claims are 
‘constructions of reality that are imbued 
with power’. 
 
The view that everything is a social 
construct has been challenged because of 
its ‘subjective nature’ which restricts 
engagement in research ‘with the 
possibility of gathering evidence about the 
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real world [96]. Jacobs and Manzi [97] 
have adopted a social constructionist 
position which views reality as a social 
construct but also recognizes to a limited 
extent, the idea of an objective material 
reality. King labelled this position as 
‘weak’ social constructionism compared to 
a ‘strong’ more radical version. Taylor 
identified that the strong form of social 
constructionism ‘can be critiqued’ for 
ignoring aspects of the objective world 
that cannot be explained as social 
constructs such as ‘a volcano exploding’. 
Fopp, stated that the weak position was 
more meaningful to housing research 
because ‘some objects can be socially 
constructed and others not’. Somerville 
[98] alleges that to challenge the 
increasing dominance of the strong version 
of social constructionism that was 
permeating housing studies in the late 20th 
and early 21st centuries, realist approaches 
were promoted by housing academics. 
Lawson, states that in the last 20 years, 
researchers ‘have had to confront a 
plurality of influential factors or causes 
which have generated differences in 
housing systems’ and ‘are not easy to 
isolate, observe or measure’. They have 
looked to CR as a philosophical approach 
that helps researchers to understand 
problems by exploring their causes by 
investigating the structures and 
mechanisms that lie beneath the phenomena 
that they are studying. Taylor views that CR 
offers the researcher ‘a way for the 
researcher to engage fully in exploring the 
real world and the social world’. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article looks at the philosophy of CR 
as one that can be used by researchers in 
the field of housing studies. The 
philosophy provides an approach that can 
be adapted to a research project and used 
as a tool to analyze the phenomena being 
studied. Housing studies has developed 
into a strong academic discipline since the 
1970s and encompasses a wealth of 
ongoing research. Housing is something 
that is experienced by most people and is 
an ongoing ‘live’ operational phenomena. 
The field of housing studies cuts across 
other academic areas of study such as 
sociology and areas of ‘lived’ experience 
within society including work and welfare. 
One of the purposes in undertaking 
research into different phenomena is to 
explore that phenomena and investigate 
issues behind it. Through its stratified 
ontological approach CR enables the 
researcher to look behind phenomena at 
the structures and mechanisms that 
influence, drive and determine actions as 
well as issues that emerge from them. The 
article is divided into three parts and the 
philosophy of CR is presented in the first 
part. The second part of the article looks at 
what research is, and the last part 
examines the tradition of realist 
philosophy in housing research. It is 
argued that within this tradition CR offers 
the housing researcher a positive way to 
develop their research. There are examples 
within the wider housing research 
literature of the application of CR, but they 
are few and the depth of application is 
often limited. 
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